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NEGLIGENCE-AUT0M0BILE-CARE

REQUIRED OP AN OPERA-

TOR.-Thies v. Thomas, 77 N. Y. Supp. 276 (Supreme Court,
1902). A little boy six years old, while playing in the street,
was run over by the defendant's automobile. Suit is here brought
in negligence for the accident. The Court defined the law of
negligence applicable to the case negatively by describing the
duty of care legally required of an operator. Its language is as
follows: "An operator of an automobile is bound to anticipate
that he may meet persons at any point in the public streets and
must keep a proper lookout for them and have his machine under
such control as will enable him to avoid a collision with another
also using proper care and caution and, if necessary, must slow
up and even stop." This is his ordinary duty of care. The
Court goes on to say, "Where the operator meets children of
tender years, he is required to exercise more than ordinary care
to avoid a collision." But the fact that the accident occurred
.between blocks and not at a street crossing was admitted as evi1o9
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dence for the jury on the question of the negligence of the operator.
This is the first and, as far as our research has revealed, the
only decision of a higher court in which the law of negligence
has been applied to the case of an automobile. As the world
has progressed, different modes of conveyance have been usedhorses, wagons and carriages, stage-coaches, tram-lines, railroads,
horse cars, elevated railroads, electric cars, bicycles and now steam
and electric automobiles. As each of these came into use the
law of negligence was enlarged and modified to apply to them.
Especially in the case of the railroad and to a lesser degree in
the case of the trolley car has the law been applied to changed
conditions. The rapidly increasing number of automobiles
demands of the courts a further interpretation of the law of
negligence as applied to these new conditions. This is a question
of real interest to-day. Therefore, a decision of authority upon
this subject must be considered worthy of attention and careful
examination.
In the English case of Boss v. Litton, 5 Car. & Payne, 407,
1832, Chief Justice Denman defines the rights of travelers on
the highways. He says: "All persons, paralytic as well as others,
have a right to walk in the road and are entitled to the exercise
of reasonable care on the part of persons driving carriages along
it." Viewed from the standpoint of later cases this is an extreme
statement of the rights of a pedestrian on a public way. As the
traffic upon city streets has become greater and the speed of
travel has increased by reason of the introduction of electric
railways, public policy has required the courts to limit the rights
of pedestrians. This has been accomplished not so much by
change in principle as by change in the interpretation of the old
terms "reasonable" and "ordinary." No courts go so far as to
say pedestrians have no rights on the highway, but they do
demand a high degree of care of any person using the street.
Drivers of vehicles are excused where this high degree of care
is not exercised by foot-passengers upon the ground of contributory negligence.
Some states make a difference between the rights of ordinary
teams and of cars on a street railway. A pedestrian and a private
team have nearly equal rights upon the highway. The case of
Rahn v. Singer Company, 26 Fed. Rep. 912, 1885, states the
general law. The Court said, "Travelers on foot and teams have
equal rights on public highways, but both are required tp exercise
the care and diligence that the circumstances demand at the
time." So, too, in the case of Stringerv. Frost, 116 Indiana, 477,
1888, it was said, "The plaintiff has a right to cross the street
at a crossing or elsewhere, exercising such caution and prudence
as the circumstances demanded to avoid being injured, while the
defendant had the right to ride along the street on horseback,
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observing such watchfulness for footmen and having his animal
under such control as would enable him to avoid injury to others
who had corresponding and reciprocal rights in the street." The
law thus holds the driver of a horse to as strict a duty of care
as it does the pedestrian; each must be equally on the lookout
for the other to prevent collision.
On the other hand, street cars are in some states given a
superior right of way. In Pennsylvania this doctrine of superior
rights has been firmly implanted in the law. It is expressed in
the case of Ehrisman v. Railway Company, 150 Pa. 180, 1892:
"Street railways have not this exclusive right [of steam railroads*]. Their tracks are used in common by their cars and
the traveling public. While this common use is conceded and is
unavoidable in towns and cities, the railway companies and the
public have not equal rights. Those of the railway companies
are superior. Their cars have the right of way and it is the
duty of the citizen whether on foot or in vehicles to give unobstructed passage to the cars. This results from two reasonsfirst, the fact that the car cannot turn out or leave its track, and
secondly, for the convenience and accommodation of the public.
These companies have been chartered for the reason, in part at
least, that they are a public accommodation. The convenience
of an individual who seeks to cross one of their tracks must give
way to the convenience of the public." This case has been
affirmed as late as 1898, in the case of Smith v. Traction Company, 187 Pa. 110.
Other states refuse to recognize such a doctrine and hold
strictly to the old doctrine that the highway is for all equally
with a reciprocal duty of care. In these states a reasonable
degree of care on the part of both rider and pedestrian is
required, but there is no attempt made to apply the strict "stop,
look and listen" rule to the pedestrian, as is done in Pennsylvania. The case of Laufer v. Traction Company, 68 Conn. 475,
1897, takes this view of the law. It declares that "electric can
have no superior rights on the highway. The right to use the
highway is common to all travelers and is to be so exercised by
each that the just rights of the others are not unreasonably interfered with." Though apparently giving a higher right to pedestrians than does the Pennsylvania doctrine, the results are practically the same in most eases.
It does not seem necessary to discuss the correctness of either
of the conflicting opinions with regard to street railways. The
reasons for allowing street cars a superior right of way and
peculiar privileges do not apply to the case of automobiles. The
latter are private conveyances and in no sense different from
horses and carriages in their use of the highway. They are not
* Editor's words.
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a public means of rapid transit and do not serve the great body
of citizens. They are merely for the convenience of individuals.
Again, they are not confined to any definite track but may
turn to right or left at will. Indeed they are more quickly and
more easily guided than horses and carriages. This freedom of
motion is one of the reasons that makes them particularly dangerous to the pedestrian. Instead of, as formerly, a single line
of track to watch, he must now watch the whole street. Instead
of certain streets upon which are laid car tracks, all streets alike
will demand of him a high degree of care. The increased speed
and comparative noiselessness add to his peril.
Common sense would seem to require of the operators of automobiles a very high degree of care upon city streets, higher than
that of drivers of other vehicles. Rapid transit for the benefit
of the public may be excused but a racing speed for the pleasure
of individuals should not be tolerated. The foot traveler has
been subjected to sufficient danger already by the street railways.
Unless some restriction is placed upon the use of the highway
by this new kind of conveyance, he will be practically excluded
from the streets. The great number of negligence cases in our
courts bear witness to the injurious effects of a high speed in
thickly populated districts. And these accidents occur in spite
of the fact that persons are put on their guard by the presence
of tracks. With automobiles speeding up and down every street
the dangers of the highway will be infinitely increased. It is for
these reasons we believe the Supreme Court correct in its decisions, in applying strictly the duty of care required of drivers of
horses'to the new conditions. A careful consideration of the
question can lead but to this conclusion. A progress which
would endanger the lives of so many of our citizens is not progress and surely cannot excuse any innovation in the law of
A. L.D.
negligence.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1ATIONAL BAXIKRUPTcY

AcT-

UNIFOR-ITY.-Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 22 Supreme
Court Reporter, 857 (United States Supreme Court, October
Term, 1901). By the fourth Clause of Section 8 of Article I of
the Constitution the power is vested in Congress "to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout
the United States." This power was first exercised in 1800. 2
Stat. at large 19, ch. 19. In 1803 that law was repealed. 2 Stat.
at large 248, ch. 6. In 1841 it was again exercised by an Act
which was repealed in 1843. 5 Stat. at large 440, ch. 9; 5 Stat.
at large 614, ch. 82. It was again exercised in 1867 by an Act
which, after being several times amended, was finally repealed in
1878. 14 Stat. at large 517, ch. 176; 20 Stat. at large 99, ch..
160. And on July 1, 1898, the present Act was approved. 30
Stat. at large 544, ch. 541.
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Under the Constitutional provision the laws passed by Congress must be uniform, and whether the Act of 1898 provides
such uniformity is the subject for consideration. Section 6 of
the Act declares that "this Act shall not affect the allowance to
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state
laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the state
wherein they have had their domicil for the six months, or the
greater portion thereof, immediately preceding the filing of the
petition."
Practically the same clause was enacted in 1867, and a glance
at the important decisions interpreting that may be of assistance
to a clear understanding of the attitude taken by the courts in
regard to this question. Section 14 of the Act of 1867 prescribed
certain exemptions and then added: "And such other property
not included in the foregoing exceptions as is exempted from
levy and sale upon execution or other process or order of any
court by the laws of the state in which the bankrupt has his
domicil at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in
bankruptcy, to an amount not exceeding that allowed by such
state exemption laws in force in the year 1864." This section
was attacked in the case of In re Beckerford, Fed. Cas. No. 1,
209, 1870, on the ground that it was not uniform in its application, since under its provisions the exemptions would vary in
different states. But the Court declared that "though the states
vary in the extent of their exemptions, yet what remains the
bankrupt law distributes equally among the creditors.
.
All contracts are made with reference to existing laws and no
creditor could recover more from his debtor under the state laws
than the unexempted part of his assets, the very thing that is
attained by the bankrupt law, which, therefore, is strictly uniform."
A subsequent and equally important case is that of In re
Deckert, 2 Hughes, 183, 1874. In that case Mr. Chief Justice
Waite in his opinion said: "The power to except from the operation of the law property liable to execution under the exemption
laws of the several states, as they were actually enforced, was at
one time questioned, upon the ground that it was a violation of
the Constitutional requirement of uniformity, but it has thus
far been sustained, for the reason that it was made a rule of the
law to subject to the payment of debts under its operation only
such property as could by judicial process be made available for
the same purpose. This is not unjust, as every debt is contracted
with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably complain
if he gets his full share of all that the law, for the time being,
places at the disposal of creditors. One of the effects of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in favor of all the
creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property subject to
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levy, and applying it to the paymient of all his debts according

to their respective priorities. It is quite proper, therefore, to
confine its operation to such property as other legal process could
reach. A rule which operates to this effect throughout the United
States is uniform within the meaning of that term, as used in
the Constitution."
The decisions in these two cases, settled beyond question the
"uniformity" of the Act of 1867, and the view expressed therein
is adopted by 'Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in the present case of
Hanover National Bank v. Moylses (supra), and by this decision
any doubt which may have arisen in regard to Section 6 of the
Act of 1898 is forever set at rest.
The opinion of MNr. Chief Justice Fuller is direct and to the
point, and is capable of no two interpretations; it is as follows:
"The laws passed on the subject (i. e., bankruptcy) must, however, be uniform throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geographical, and not personal, and we do not think
that the provision of the Act of 1898 as to exemptions is incompatible with the rule. Under the Act of 1867

.

.

.

it was

many times ruled that this provision was not in derogation of
the limitation of uniformity because all contracts were made
with reference to existing laws, and no creditor could recover
more from his debtor than the unexempted part of his assets.
We concur in this view, and hold that the system is. in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States, when
the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed.
The 'general operation of the law is uniform although it may
result in certain particulars differently in different states."
The sentence last quoted suggests the ground upon which the
correctness of the view held by the Court in this case may be
doubted. That the law is settled is undoubtedly clear to all, but
that the ground taken by the courts in so deciding is beyond
criticism is not so clear. Is a law uniform within the meaning
of that term as used in the Constitution when its results are so
varied in the different states? It is suggested that what the
courts have really said is this: A bankrupt law to be uniform
must exempt in each state only those assets which a creditor
cannot take in any other proceedings, and this is what. the Act
of 1898 has enacted, therefore the Act of 1898 is uniform. But
does the Constitution mean that a creditor under proceedings in
bankruptcy can have only those rights which lie would have
against his debtor in any other proceedings, or that the creditor
of a bankrupt shall have the same rights against his debtor
whether he be in the East or in the West, in the North or in the
South? If the former be the true intent, that the exemptions
under proceedings in bankruptcy must be uniform with exemptions in all other proceedings, then no objection can be raised;
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but if the latter be the object intended by the framers of the
Constitution, then it is submitted that the Act of 1898 fails
utterly to accomplish the same. Under the present Act the
following result is possible: X. is a bank in New York, and A.,
B., C., D. and E. are insolvent debtors of X., and they have all
filed petitions in bankruptcy. A. is a citizen of New York,
where he is allowed about $1,000 in exemptions; B. resides in
California and is allowed $5,000; C. in Pennsylvania retains
$300; D. in New Castle County, Delaware, may retain only $75,
while his neighbor a few miles away in :Kent County of the same
state retains but $50. Can it be said that an Act which permits
such wide discrepancies among the several states is uniform
throughout the United States?
In each of the three decisions quoted above the Court has
resorted to the same argument in support of its decision: That
"as every debt is contracted with reference to the rights of the
parties thereto under existing exemption laws, no creditor can
reasonably complain if he gets his full share of all that the law
for the time being places at the disposal of creditors." Such
an argument may have had some force under the Act of 1867,
but it is submitted that it is utterly fallacious when applied to
the Act of 1898. Section 6 of the Act allows to the bankrupt
those exemptions "which are prescribed by the state laws in force
at the time of the filing of the petition." Now it is evident that
the law with reference to which the debt was contracted and the
law under which the creditor gets his share of all that is placed
at the disposal of the creditors of the bankrupt may be entirely
different in their provisions. Suppose for instance A. is indebted
to B. upon February 1, 1902, when, under the laws of Pennsylvania, the debtor is entitled to $300 exemptions. On February
10, 1902, the legislature passes an Act enlarging the exemptions
to $1,000, and on February 25, 1902, A. files his petition in
bankruptcy. Under the Act of 1898 A. would be entitled to
claim exemption to amount of $1,000, and yet prior to this time
although the same Act had been in force for more than three
years all other bankrupts were entitled to retain but $300. If
such a result as this be not a delegation of the power of Congress,
as Air. Chief Justice Fuller has said, then it is submitted that it
is but further evidence of the lack of uniformity in that, even
in the same state, the rights of bankrupts may be so very different, although the petitions of all are filed during the time that
the same Act is in force. Recognizing the fact that the Supreme
Court has declared that the Act of 1898 is uniform, and bowing
with all deference to that decision, it is, nevertheless, impossible
for at least one humble member of the community to grasp the
fact that the law enacted by Congress upon July 1, 1898, has in
it those elements of uniformity which the Constitution declares
to be pre-eminently essential to its existence as a legal creation.
Win. Clarke Mason.

